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THE PROSECUTOR'S UNNECESSARY USE OF
HEARSAY EVIDENCE BEFORE THE
GRAND JURY
The prosecutor's presentation of hearsay evidence' to the grand jury
has initiated controversy among courts2 and commentators.3 Propo-
nents of the use of hearsay evidence at the grand jury assert that com-
pliance with the hearsay rule would unduly hamper the indictment
process and that the grand jury, because it is composed of lay-persons,
is ill-equipped to apply such a rule.4 Moreover, proponents contend
that judicial review of the evidence presented to the grand jury would
constitute a preliminary mini-trial and create unnecessary delay and
expense.5 Finally, proponents assert that the Supreme Court, in Cos-
I. For purposes of this Note, the term "hearsay evidence" does not include evidence that
would qualify as a hearsay exception at trial. Hearsay evidence is defined by Professor McCor-
mick as: "Testimony in court, or written evidence, of a statement made out-of-court, the state-
ment being offered as an assertion to show the truth of matters asserted therein, and thus resting
for its value upon the credibility of the out-of-court asserter." C. McCoRMICK, McCoRMIcK's
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 246, at 584 (Cleary ed. 1972). See also FED. R. EvID.
801(c): " 'Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the
trial or hearing, offered in evidence, to prove the truth of the matter asserted."
Hearsay that does not qualify as an exception is incompetent evidence. The competence doc-
trine excludes evidence at trial because of its questionable reliability. Hearsay evidence is consid-
ered unreliable because: the declarant is not under oath when he made the statement; the trier of
fact is unable to observe the declarant's demeanor in order to shed light on his credibility; and the
declarant cannot undergo cross-examination. For further discussion about the hearsay rule and
its exceptions, see C. MCCORMICK, supra, §§ 244-327.
2. See infra notes 42-103 and accompanying text. See also 37 A.L.R. 3d 612 (1971).
3. See infra notes 104-119 and accompanying text; The Grand Jury Reform Act of 1978:
Hearings on S.3405 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate
Commt on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 154 (1978) (statement of Professor Leroy D. Clark,
New York University School of Law) [hereinafter cited as 1978 Senate Hearings]; id at 147 (state-
ment of Richard E. Gerstein, Chairman, Comm. on Grand Jury, Criminal Justice Section, Ameri-
can Bar Association); id at 105 (statement of Philip B. Heymann, Assistant Attorney General,
Criminal Division, Department of Justice); id at 162 (statement of Professor Melvin Lewis, John
Marshall Law School); J. COOK, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED PRETRIAL RIGHTS
488-90 (1972); Arenella, Reforming The Federal Grand Jury and The State Preliminary Hearing to
Prevent Conviction Without Adjudication, 78 MICH. L. REV. 463, 496-99 (1980); Boudin, The Fed-
eral Grand Jury, 61 GEo. L.J. 1, 25-29 (1972).
4. See 37 A.L.R. 3d 612, 614 (1971); Note, The Grand Jury: Powers, Procedures and
Problems, 9 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 681, 727-29 (1973).
5. See infra note 49 and accompanying text. See also United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. I,
17 (1973) ("[amny holding that would saddle a grand jury with minitrials and preliminary showings
would assuredly impede its investigation and frustrate the public's interest in the fair and expedi-
tious administration of the criminal laws"); Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 70 (1972)
Washington University Open Scholarship
192 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 61:191
tello v. United States,6 conclusively resolved the issue in favor of al-
lowing the prosecutor to present hearsay evidence to the grand jury.7
Critics, on the other hand, assert that the prosecutor's use of hearsay
evidence limits the grand jury's ability to perform its historical function
as an independent buffer between the government and the accused by
distorting the grand jury's perception of the evidence.8 Critics particu-
larly abhor prosecutorial use of the hearsay testimony of a single wit-
ness, usually a police officer, who testifies from his recollection of what
eyewitnesses have told him.9 Opponents contend that the presentation
of "polished" testimony by "professional" witnesses' ° severely limits
the grand jury's ability to judge the credibility of the declarant and to
evaluate the strength of the state's case.I This practice, the critics fear,
(White, J., concurring) (evidentiary rules would instigate suppression hearings which would result
in protracted interruption of grand jury proceedings). One commentator asserted:
[W]hen hearsay is admitted, it does not follow that a grand jury's effectiveness will be
diluted. . . . [H]earsay, by its very nature, may be translated into competent evidence
by the time of trial if the originator or primary source of the hearsay testifies in
court. ... [A] rule [to quash indictments based on hearsay] would demand either the
presence of a judge or master at the grand jury proceeding, or a pretrial hearsay hearing.
The former is certainly undesirable; it would alter the traditional structure of the grand
jury, seriously cripple its investigative function, and place an additionally heavy burden
on judicial time.
Note, Validity of Indictment Based Solely on Hearsay Questioned When Direct Testimony is Readily
Available, 43 N.Y.U. L. REv. 578, 581-83 (1978).
6. 350 U.S. 359 (1956).
7. See infra notes 42-54. See generally J. COOK, supra note 3, at 488-89, 490 n.12.
8. The purpose of the grand jury is to determine whether there is probable cause that a
crime has been committed by the accused. Probable cause is a "minimum standard" for the grand
jury to screen out weak cases prior to trial. See Note, The Rules of Evidence as a Factor in Prob-
able Cause in Grand Jury Proceedings and Preliminary Examinations, 1963 WASH. U.L.Q. 102, 103.
9. The prosecutor sometimes presents "second-hand" testimony rather than direct evidence,
even when the latter is available. See 8 J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 6.03[2], at 6-62
(1982) (using government agents is clearly more convenient for the prosecutor); Arenella, supra
note 3, at 497 (criticizes the use of second-hand testimony by prosecutors). See also United States
v. Malofsky, 388 F.2d 288 (2d Cir.) (government withheld testimony of narcotics agent with first-
hand information), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1017 (1968); United States v. Payton, 363 F.2d 996 (2d
Cir.) (failure of prosecutor to present eyewitness testimony and to inform jury of hearsay nature of
testimony), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 993 (1966); United States v. Borelli, 336 F.2d 376 (2d Cir. 1964)
(same), cert. denied sub nom. Cinquegrano v. United States, 379 U.S. 960 (1965). See generally
United States v. Leibowitz, 420 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1969) (draft evasion; no government trial wit-
nesses at grand jury); United States v. Umans, 368 F.2d 725 (2d Cir. 1966) (bribery; second-hand
witness summarizes affidavits), cert. dismissed, 389 U.S. 80 (1967).
10. See Note, supra note 4, at 728. See also 8 J. MOORE, supra note 9, 1 6.03[2J, at 6-62.
11. See C. WHITEBREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 19.06, at 390 (1980) (grand jury cannot
accurately judge sufficiency of evidence of crime if evidence not admissible at trial is used). See
also Arenella, supra note 3, at 497 n.178; Note, supra note 4, at 728.
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permits the prosecutor to hamper or even to nullify the grand jury's
screening function,12 and deprives the defendant of a "meaningful"
grand jury transcript 3 to use for impeachment 14 purposes at trial.15
Although most courts permit prosecutorial presentation of hearsay
evidence to grand juries, 16 some jurisdictions have restricted this gen-
12. See infra notes 60-66 and accompanying text. See, e.g., United States v. Arcuri, 282 F.
Supp. 347 (E.D.N.Y.), aft'd, 405 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 913 (1969). In
Arcuri, the district court criticized the deliberate use of government agents as witnesses and con-
cluded that because "[ajil cases are presented in an equally homogenized form," the grand jury "is
unable to adequately serve its function as a screening agency." Id. at 349. See also Arenella,
supra note 3, at 495.
One commentator suggested that the grand jury, by basing its decision on incompetent evi-
dence, is acting beyond the scope of its authority:
If the rules of evidence regulate the proof on the basis of which conviction at the trial
must rest, and if the purpose of the grand jury proceeding . . . is to predict the
probability of such a conviction, then a prediction which does not take into account
those rules of evidence is not a prediction at all, but an independent determination of
probable guilt.
Note, supra note 8, at 123.
13. The term "meaningful transcript" refers to a transcript that will be of some use to a
defendant at trial. Frequently, the defense will attempt to impeach the state's witnesses with prior
inconsistent statements found in the transcript. McCormick explains that "[t]he theory of attack
by prior inconsistent statements is not based on the assumption that the present testimony is false
but rather upon the notion that talking one way on the stand and another way previously is
blowing hot and cold, and raises a doubt as to the truthfulness of both statements." C. McCoR-
MICK, supra note 1, § 34, at 68.
For a discussion criticizing the use of hearsay before the grand jury because such use under-
mines the defendant's criminal discovery rights, see 8 J. MOORE, supra note 9, 1 6.0312], at 6-62;
Note, supra note 5, at 582.
14. Statements made by a witness at the grand jury constitute pretrial statements. If at trial
the witness' testimony is inconsistent with a pretrial statement, then the statement may be admit-
ted as evidence to impeach his memory or sincerity. See E. IMWINKELRIED, EVIDENTIARY FOUN-
DATIONS 43 (1980).
15. See Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855 (1966) (severely limits court's discretionary
power to deny disclosure of grand jury transcript); Jencks Act of 1959, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1976)
(after government witness testifies on direct examination, defendant may make motion and court
shall order government to produce any statement made by witness; amended in 1970 to include
statements at grand jury); FED. R. CiuM. P. 16(a) (gives defendant right to discover his testimony
at grand jury); Note, supra note 5, at 582 (prosecutor's use of hearsay evidence at grand jury may
render discovery right illusory). See generaly C. McCoRMICK, supra note 1, § 97, at 209-11. But
see C. WHrTEBREAD, supra note 11, § 19.05, at 384 & n.63 (some jurisdictions do not require
grand jury proceedings to be transcribed).
An additional consequence of permitting hearsay evidence, rather than live testimony, at the
grand jury is that the threat of prosecution of the witness for perjury based on his grand jury
testimony is no longer available. Perjury is the judicial safeguard against false testimony. The
witness who is relaying hearsay testimony, however, is not subject to charges of perjury because he
is merely transmitting what an out-of-court declarant told him. The declarant is not liable for
perjury because he was not speaking under oath.
16. See infra notes 42-54 and accompanying text.
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eral rule.17 In addition, several state legislatures have attempted to di-
minish the use of hearsay in state grand jury proceedings.' 8 Moreover,
several congressional subcommittees have considered reformation of
the federal grand jury to limit the use of hearsay. t9
This Note argues that the presentation of hearsay evidence to the
grand jury detrimentally affects the grand jury's ability to discharge its
historically delegated responsibilities.2 0 The Note proposes as a solu-
tion legislative action restricting the situations in which the prosecutor
may present hearsay evidence to the grand jury. This proposal imposes
duties on the prosecutors, judges, and grand jurors.2 '
I. EVOLUTION OF THE GRAND JURY SYSTEM
In the seventeenth century the centralized English government cre-
ated the grand jury22 as a means for interjecting the insight of local lay
persons into the process of apprehending criminals.23 The grand jury's
primary function as an independent entity was to investigate and pres-
17. See infra notes 55-84 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 90-103 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 110-19 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 120-23 and accompanying text.
Some critics believe that prosecutors have totally stripped the grand jury of its historical screen-
ing function, thus reducing the grand jury to a rubber stamp. These critics believe that the grand
jury's utility is beyond salvation. Therefore, they advocate abolition of the grand jury. Such a
proposal, however, is beyond the scope of this Note. For an in depth discussion on abolition of
the grand jury, see Calkins, Abolition of Grand Jury Indictments in Illinois, 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 423;
Campbell, Delays in Criminal Cases, 55 F.R.D. 229 (1972); Campbell, Eliminate the Grand Jury, 64
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 174 (1973).
The Administration of Justice Act of 1933 abolished the grand jury in England. See Elliff,
Notes on the Abolition of the English Grand Jury, 29 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 3 (1938).
21. See infra notes 128-46 and accompanying text.
22. The grand jury originated in England at the time of the Assize of Claredon in 1164. See
1 W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 321 (1922); A. MANCHESTER, A MODERN LEGAL
HISTORY OF ENGLAND & WALES, 1750-1950, at 93 (1980); L. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 137-42 (1947); T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON-
LAW 111 (5th ed. 1956); F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE
THE TIME OF EDWARD I 641-49 (2d ed. 1899).
23. Note, Grand Jury as an Investigatory Body, 74 HARV. L. REV. 590 (1961). See also T.
PLUNCKNETT, supra note 22, at 112 (explains why England instituted grand jury system):
A great deal of information of value to the King could be obtained by compelling the
inhabitants of a small community to answer questions, to inform against evil-doers, to
disclose mysterious crimes, and tell of their suspicions .... [Trhe inquiry into crime
and criminals was ... a matter of deep concern to the Crown, not merely as a matter of
public policy but also as a course of revenue, for criminal jurisdiction with its fines and
forfeitures was always lucrative.
Id. See generally United States v. Smyth, 104 F. Supp. 283 (N.D. Cal. 1952); Orfield, The Federal
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ent to the government persons suspected of criminal activity. The
grand jurors were permitted to base their opinions on personal knowl-
edge or on information received from others.24
The English grand jury also served as a "bulwark of individual free-
dom."25 Thus, they were required to be "[t]horoughly persuaded of the
truth of an indictment" based upon the available evidence.26 To issue a
true bill of indictment, the grand jurors were required to have grounds
to suspect that the defendant probably had committed the crime. This
function surfaced in the notorious case of the Earl of Shaftesbury's
Trial,27 when the English government demanded an indictment against
the Earl. The grand jury, finding no probable suspicion that the Earl
had committed a crime, refused to return a true bill.28 The English
grand jury thus assumed a reputation as guardian of the citizens
against malicious prosecutions by the crown.2 9
The framers of the United States Constitution recognized the signifi-
cance of the grand jury when they drafted the fifth amendment.30
Grand Jury, 22 F.R.D. 343 (1958); Note, Fourth Amendment Protection For a Grand Jury Witness,
10 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 701 (1972).
24. See W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 22, at 321. Seealso Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 65-66
(1906) ("grand jury may not indict upon current rumors or unverified reports,.. . [bjut may act
upon knowledge acquired either from their own observations or upon the evidence of witnesses
25. See Note, supra note 23, at 590.
26. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *303.
27. 8 State Trials 759 (1681).
28. Id. at 775. In this case, the Crown sought to indict the Earl for commission of high
treason against the King and the English government. The grand jury, despite tremendous pres-
sure from the government, id at 775-826, returned a finding of Ignoramus, which meant that they
did not find probable cause to believe that the Earl had committed a crime.
29. See, e.g., Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962) (grand jury protects against "hasty,
malicious and oppressive persecution"); Exparte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 11 (1887) (grand jury provides
barrier against oppressive prosecutions).
30. The fifth amendment provides in part: "No person shall be held to answer for a capital
or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment of indictment of a Grand Jury." U.S.
CONST. amend. V. See Exparte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 12 (1887); L. CLARK, THE GRAND JURY 13-20
(1934); M. FRANKEL, THE GRAND JURY 11-17 (1977); Note, supra note 23, at 591. See also COA-
LITION TO END GRAND JURY ABUSE, SO YOU'RE GOING TO BE A GRAND JUROR?, reprinted in
Grand Jury Reform: Hearing on H. 94 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenshp, and
International Law of the House Comn on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 484 (1977) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Grand Jury Reform]:
There was no mystery behind the grand jury's inclusion in the Bill of Rights. The
people who won our independence were well aware that a government could manipulate
the criminal law to punish its critics--and they were determined to prevent that kind of
oppression from rearing its head in their new nation. Making a person stand trial, they
realized, was in itself a penalty of sorts, an emotionally and financially draining ordeal
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has frequently acknowl-
edged the grand jury's importance, and recognized that the American
grand jury possesses substantially the same powers as its English proto-
type.31 Unlike the English grand jury, however, which retained sub-
stantial independence from the crown, the American grand jury is
dominated by the prosecutor. 32 This disparity is primarily attributable
to the differing roles of the government's attorney in each system.33
At common law, the attorney for the crown performed the sole task
that even an eventual verdict of not guilty could never erase. No citizen should suffer
this experience, the authors of the Bill of Rights felt, unless an independent panel of
citizens, the grand jury, decided that the evidence warranted bringing an accused to trial.
A free people, after all, could not allow the government to decide whom to bring to trial.
The danger that politically motivated or overzealous prosecutors would subject the inno-
cent to trial on trumped-up charges or whitewash the crimes of the guilty was just too
great.
Id. at 448 (emphasis in original).
31. See, e.g., Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282 (1919) (fifth amendment recognizes
grand jury as being possessed of same powers as British); United States v. Smyth, 104 F. Supp,
283, 290 (N.D. Cal. 1952) (United States Constitution preserved grand jury with all its powers and
inherent character).
One commentator agreed that the American grand jury began as a duplicate of the English
grand jury, but recognized that it has since undergone transformation:
As an individual institution, the grand jury probably has not changed a great deal
since it was first brought here from England. However, the other governmental bodies
with which it must work have undergone radical transformation. Colonial America
knew nothing of massive urban areas, of organized police departments, or of the laby-
rinth of state and federal criminal laws. Thus, while the grand jury has not changed
significantly its environment is very different. Few grand juries sitting in a highly popu-
lated urban area are likely from their experience and the knowledge of their members to
have probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and that accused com-
mitted it, therefore, 'presentments' in the traditional sense are unlikely.
C. DOYLE, THE FEDERAL GRAND JURY (1976) (unpublished study by the Library of Congress),
reprinted in Federal Grand Jury: Hearings on H.J Res. 46, H. 1277 and Related Bills Before the
Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenshp, and International Law of the House Comm. on the Judlcl-
ary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 671 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 1976 House Hearings]. See generally
1978 Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 1118-45.
32. See J. JACOBY, THE AMERICAN PROSECtyroR: A SEARCH FOR IDENTITY 11-36 (1980); 1
J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 4, at 22-23 (1940). See also Johnston, The Grand Jury-
ProsecutorialAbuse of the Indictment Process, 65 J. CrIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 157, 160-61 (1974)
("[w]hile the grand jury in England was able to maintain considerable independence from govern-
ment prosecutors, the grand jury today is much more dependent on the prosecutor ... [because]
the grand jury normally hears only those cases presented by the prosecutor and only the prosecu-
tion's side of those cases"); Note, Grand Jury Proceedings: The Prosecutor, the Trial Judge, and
Undue Influence, 39 U. CHI. L. REv. 761, 764 (1960) (prosecutor's role in collecting information
and presenting it to grand jurors renders the modem grand jury a passive instrument).
33. See infra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
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of representing the government.34 In United States jurisprudence,
however, the prosecutor performs a bifurcated task." On the one
hand, he must prosecute the government's case to the fullest extent to
ensure that the guilty shall not escape punishment. 36 Accordingly, he
investigates charges, selects the cases to be prosecuted, and presents ev-
idence to the grand jury.37 Simultaneously, however, the prosecutor
must act as an impartial legal advisor to the grand jury.38
Despite its dependence on the prosecutor, the American grand jury
performs the crucial task of screening evidence and deciding whether to
indict.39 Although the grand jury's screening function safeguards soci-
ety from wasteful litigation, it also protects defendants from incurring
the aggravation, expense, and public humiliation of a trial before the
state establishes probable cause.4"
34. See Note, supra note 32, at 765 n.24 (attorney for Crown not allowed into grand jury
proceeding because he had no duty to advise or aid grand jury).
35. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935). In Berger, the Court, recognizing soci-
ety's twofold objective for the prosecutor, asserted that this objective is based on the premise that
while the guilty should not escape punishment, the innocent should not suffer. Id. at 88. See also
United States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306, 1312 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 325 (1977); J.
JACOBY, supra note 32, at XV.
36. See L. CLARK, supra note 30, at 141-42.
37. See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 65 (1906) (prosecutor has "discretion with respect to the
cases he will call to the grand jury's attention, the number and character of the witnesses, the form
in which the indictment shall be drawn, and other details of the proceedings"); GAO, COMPTROL-
LER GEN. REP. TO CONGRESS 3 (1980) (prosecutors "advise jurors on points of law, coordinate
appearances of witnesses and presentation of evidence, and question most witnesses").
38. See ABA FEDERAL GRAND JURY HANDBOOK 16 (1959) (prosecutor should be constant
legal advisor); Note, supra note 32, at 765 (prosecutor advises and conducts grand jury in an
orderly fashion).
39. See Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 218 (1960); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 65
(1906); United States v. Farrington, 5 F. 343, 345 (N.D.N.Y. 1881).
The grand jury performs two tasks. Not only does it investigate suspected criminal ability, but
it formally charges a defendant when it finds probable cause to believe that he committed a crime.
This Note does not consider the grand jury in its investigative role. Instead, it focuses on the
grand jury's accusatorial role, which entails a review of the evidence by the grand jury to deter-
mine whether probable cause that a crime has been committed exists. See ABA FEDERAL GRAND
JURY HANDBOOK, supra note 38, at 9-11 (discussion of grand jury's accusatorial function). For a
general discussion of the grand jury's two-pronged function, see Keeney & Walsh, The American
Bar Association s Grand Jury Princrles: .4 Critique From a Federal Criminal Justice Perspective, 14
IDAHO L. REV. 545, 550-53 (1978).
40. The proponents of the use of hearsay at the grand jury assert that any injustice committed
at the grand jury level is inconsequential because the defendant will be able to rectify the situation
at trial. But see In re Fried, 161 F.2d 453 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 858, cert. dismissed, 332
U.S. 806 (1947), in which Judge Frank stated: "This] is an astonishingly callous argument which
ignores the obvious. For a wrongful indictment is no laughing matter, often it works a grievous,
irreparable injury to the person indicted.... Prosecutors have an immense discretion in institut-
Washington University Open Scholarship
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II. HEARSAY EVIDENCE AT GRAND JURY: COSTELLO
V UNITED STATES
Because grand jurors base their decision to indict on the evidence
presented, the quality of this evidence is crucial. Hearsay evidence is
generally inadmissible at trial because of its inherent unreliability.41
Regardless of the unacceptability of hearsay evidence at the trial level,
however, the Supreme Court, in Costello v. United States ,42 held that an
indictment based solely on hearsay evidence did not violate the fifth
amendment.43 Furthermore, the Court declined to use its supervisory
powers" to prohibit grand juries from returning such indictments.4
In Costello, defendant was suspected of tax evasion. The state con-
ducted an extensive investigation, which resulted in the presentation of
144 witnesses and 368 exhibits at trial. The prosecutor, however,
presented a summary of that evidence to the grand jury through testi-
mony of three government agents, none of whom had personally wit-
nessed the transactions on which they based their testimony.46 Costello
was indicted and subsequently convicted at an error-free trial.47 On
appeal, defendant claimed that the indictment, which was based solely
on hearsay evidence, violated his constitutional rights. The Supreme
Court rejected this argument, holding that the fifth amendment re-
quired only that an indictment be returned by a legally constituted and
unbiased grand jury.48 In addition, the Court expressed the concern
ing criminal proceedings which may lastingly besmirch reputations." Id. at 458-59. See also L.
ORFIELD, supra note 22, at 145; Goldstein, The State and the Accused" Balance of Advantage in
Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1172 (1960). See generally Note, supra note 5, at 579-80
(screening function can protect "society from wasteful litigation based on insubstantial evidence"
and persons from "vexation, cost, and notoriety of a needless public prosecution"); Note, supra
note 32, at 762 (indictment can cause accused loss of employment, lessening of community respect,
and expensive, time-consuming legal battle).
41. See supra note 1.
42. 350 U.S. 359 (1956).
43. Id. at 361-62. In Costello, the Supreme Court restricted fifth amendment constitutional
challenges at the grand jury level to two narrow situations. First, a defendant may contest his
indictment if the grand jury was illegally constituted. In this type of case, a particular group of
citizens have been intentionally excluded from the grand jury system. See Rose v. Mitchell, 443
U.S. 545 (1979) (blacks); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977) (Mexican-Americans). The
second situation is when the defendant proves that the grand jury was biased. See United States
v. Samango, 607 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1979) (discussed infra note 48).
44. The court's supervisory powers are discussed infra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
45. 350 U.S. at 362-63.
46. Id at 360.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 361-63. See United States v. Samango, 607 F.2d 8-77 (9th Cir. 1979). In Samango,
[Vol. 61:191
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that if a defendant were permitted to challenge an indictment based on
the alleged incompetency of the evidence presented, defendants would
routinely insist on a preliminary trial to judge the evidence at the in-
dictment stage.49
Costello is particularly noteworthy because of its unique factual situ-
ation. In Costello, the witnesses testifying before the grand jury were
Internal Revenue agents who summarized facts compiled by their sub-
ordinates pertaining to defendant's net-worth. 50 The credibility of the
Internal Revenue employees who compiled the information, however,
was not in controversy at trial.5'
Nevertheless, in many criminal prosecutions, the credibility of the
government's witnesses is a major issue at trial. Narcotics prosecutions,
for example, often evolve from an informant's tip. The informant,
whose credibility is frequently attacked at trial, is typically a narcotics
user or an accomplice of the defendant. In such cases, if the prosecutor
only presents the grand jury with oral testimony of a police officer who
has previously spoken with the informant, then the grand jury is pre-
cluded from judging the true quality of the state's case. If, in contrast,
the grand jurors were permitted to hear the testimony directly from the
informant, then they might reach a different conclusion based upon
the Ninth Circuit focused on Costello's fifth amendment requirement that the grand jury be unbi-
ased, and affirmed the district court's dismissal of the indictment. Id. at 885. The prosecutor in
Samango expressed to the grand jury his dissatisfaction with the witness, who subsequently be-
came the defendant, and who was under a nonprosecution agreement, immediately preceeding the
testimony of the witness. Furthermore, during his testimony, the witness requested to speak with
his attorney. In response, the prosecutor, in a mocking fashion, asked the witness if he intended
deliberately to prolong the proceedings. The appellate court noted its reluctance "to encroach on
the constitutionally-based independence of the prosecutor and grand jury," but affirmed the dis-
trict court's dismissal of the indictment. Id. at 881. The court ruled that the prosecutor had im-
properly influenced the grand jury's perception of the witness, thereby causing grand jury bias.
Id. at 882. The court labelled the prosecutor's abuse of his control over the grand jury proceed-
ings as "arbitrary and capricious and violative of due process." Id. at 881.
See also United States v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 518 F. Supp. 179 (C.D. Cal. 1981) (court found
that prosecutor's hostile conduct undermined grand jury's ability to make a fair appraisal of evi-
dence; indictment dismissed). But see United States v. Georgalis, 631 F.2d 1199 (5th Cir. 1980)
(defendant must demonstrate specifically "biased" grand jury-general showing not sufficient).
49. 350 U.S. at 363.
50. Id. at 360. In a net-worth prosecution the primary function of witnesses is not to add
facts relating to the actual commission of the crime, but to identify accounting and financial docu-
ments. Given this role, the witness' credibility is rarely in question. One commentator proposed
that the Costello Court could have based its decision on the narrow factual situation of a net-
worth prosecution. 8 J. MOORE, supra note 9, 1 6.03[2], at 6-62.
51. 350 U.S. at 360.
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considerations of the informant's dubious credibility.52
Federal and state courts refuse to confine Costello to postconviction
challenges to indictments based entirely on hearsay evidence by wit-
nesses whose duty is to synthesize voluminous records and whose credi-
bility is not at issue in the case. 53 Instead, courts interpret Costello to
deny any challenge to the competency or adequacy of the evidence
presented to the grand jury.54
52. Therefore, Costello should be confined to cases in which the credibility of the declarant is
not in question.
53. See supra note 46 and accompanying text; infra note 54. But see United States v.
Gramolini, 301 F. Supp. 39, 42 (D.R.I. 1969):
In the twelve years since the decision in Costello, the breadth of that rationale has con-
siderably been narrowed by decisions of the lower federal courts .... [t]he deliberate
use of hearsay testimony alone ... is a questionable practice which so seriously depreci-
ates the function of the grand jury as a fact investigator and determiner of probable
cause as to suggest a watering down of the grand jury contemplated by the Fifth Amend-
ment. . . . [Wihere the evidence is not voluminous and where first-hand evidence is
readily and conveniently available ... hearsay evidence cannot be the sole evidence
presented to the grand jury. At the same time, however, I recognize that in certain kinds
of cases, where voluminous evidence must be presented, as for example in Costello, hear-
say must be used.
Id.
54. See, e.g., United States v. Rogers, 652 F.2d 972, 975 (10th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Myers, 635 F.2d 932, 941 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 956 (1980); United States v. Fife, 573
F.2d 369, 371-72 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 933 (1977); United States v. Neff, 525 F.2d
361, 363 (8th Cir. 1975); United States v. Basurto, 497 F.2d 781, 785 (9th Cir. 1974); United States
v. Harrington, 490 F.2d 487,489 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Duham Concrete Prods., Inc., 475
F.2d 1241, 1248 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 832 (1973); United States v. Marshall, 471 F.2d
1051, 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United States v. Akin, 464 F.2d 7, 18 (8th Cir. 1972); United States v.
Kenny, 462 F.2d 1205, 1213 (3d Cir. 1972); United States v. Kysar, 459 F.2d 422, 424 (10th Cir.
1972); United States v. Gower, 447 F.2d 187, 191 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 850 (1971);
Reyes v. United States, 417 F.2d 705, 708 (7th Cir. 1971); Jack v. United States, 409 F.2d 522, 523
(9th Cir. 1969); United States v. Ricciardi, 357 F.2d 91, 98 (2d Cir. 1965); Williams v. United
States, 344 F.2d 264, 266 (8th Cir. 1965); United States v. Keig, 334 F.2d 823, 828-29 (7th Cir.
1964); United States v. Tane, 329 F.2d 848, 853 (2d Cir. 1964); United States v. Labate, 270 F.2d
122, 124 (3d Cir. 1959); Ford v. United States, 233 F.2d 56, 60 (5th Cir. 1956); J. CooK, supra note
3, at 490; Arenella, supra note 3, at 493; Boudin, supra note 3, at 26; Note, Federal Grand Jury
Investigation of Political Dissidents, 7 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 432, 456 (1972); Note, Unconstiltu-
tionaly Obtained Evidence Before the Grand Jury as a Basisfor Dismissing the Indictment, 27 MD.
L. REv. 168, 174 (1967); Note, Grand Jury: A Prosecutor Need Not Present Exculpatory Evidence,
38 WASH. & LEE L. RaV. 110, 113-14 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Note, Grand Jury]. See also
United States v. Riccobene, 451 F.2d 586 (3d Cir. 1971).
The Supreme Court has supplemented the Costello doctrine. In Lawn v. United States, 355
U.S. 339 (1958), for example, the Court refused to consider the charge that evidence violating
defendant's fifth amendment right against self-incrimination had been admitted to the grand jury.
The Court ruled that Costello precluded judicial review of the evidence presented to the grand
jury. Id. at 349-50. In United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251 (1966), defendant claimed that the
indictment violated his fifth amendment right not to be compelled to testify against himself and
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III. CIRCUMVENTION OF THE COSTELLO HOLDING
A. The Prosecutorial Misconduct Doctrine
Although Costello foreclosed constitutional challenges to the quality
of the evidence presented to the grand jury, some courts have circum-
vented the decision" by applying a doctrine of "prosecutorial miscon-
duct." 56 The prosecutorial misconduct doctrine represents an exercise
the Court again refused to review evidence presented to the grand jury. Id. at 255. In Blue,
defendant simultaneously was defending himself in the tax court for tax evasion and in the crimi-
nal court for criminal tax fraud. He was compelled to testify in the civil suit and subsequently
such testimony was the basis for his indictment. The Court suppressed the testimony at the crimi-
nal trial, but refused to dismiss the indictment. Id. at 252.
In 1974, the Court refused to dismiss an indictment when the grand jury received evidence
violative of defendant's fourth amendment right against illegal search and seizure. United States
v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974). In Calandra, the Court relied on Costello's hypothesis that
permitting defendants to challenge the evidence upon which they were indicted would "delay and
disrupt" grand jury proceedings. Id. at 349.
Calandra, however, questions whether the exclusionary rule should be extended to grand jury
proceedings. Courts invoke the exclusionary rule at trial to deter police misconduct. In contrast,
Costello concerned the applicability of the hearsay rule to grand jury proceedings. Hearsay is
excluded at trial because of its inherent unreliability.
Finally, in Bracy v. United States, 435 U.S. 1301 (1978), Justice Rehnquist, relying on Costello,
refused to stay the circuit court's judgment or to dismiss the indictment based on peijured testi-
mony, and thereby affirmed the conviction. Rehnquist reasoned that inadmissible evidence, such
as peijured testimony, at the trial level threatens the integrity of the judicial system. He asserted,
however, that such evidence posed no such threat at the grand jury level. Id. at 1302-03 (Rehn-
quist, Circuit Justice).
See generally 8 J. MOORE, supra note 9,16.03, at 6-63 to -64; C. WHITEBREAD, supra note 11, at
§ 19.06(9).
55. See, e.g., United States v. Lawson, 502 F. Supp. 158, 169 (D. Md. 1980). In Lawson, the
court recognized that by invoking the prosecutorial misconduct doctrine, federal courts were cor-
recting grand jury abuses while simultaneously evading Costello's proscription of direct examina-
tion of the quality of evidence presented to the grand jury. See also Boudin, supra note 3, at 26.
Boudin believes that Costello is plainly bad law and therefore advocates the prosecutorial miscon-
duct doctrine to circumvent Costello.
56. The prosecutorial misconduct doctrine is a nebulous concept that some courts invoke
when they believe that the prosecutor, in order to obtain an indictment, has flagrantly abused his
role as presenter of the evidence to the grand jury. The Ninth Circuit attempted to define the
doctrine in United Stales v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306 (9th Cir. 1977):
On occasion, and in widely-varying factual contexts, federal courts have dismissed
indictments because of the way in which the prosecution sought and secured the charges
from the grand jury .... These dismissals have been based either on constitutional
grounds or on the court's inherent supervisory powers..... [Tihe courts' goal has been
. .."to protect the integrity of the judicial process,". . . particularly the function of the
grand jury, from unfair or improper prosecutorial conduct.
Id. at 1309.
Courts have invoked the prosecutorial misconduct doctrine in two other evidentiary situations
involving the grand jury. For example, in United States v. Basurto, 497 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1974), a
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of the court's supervisory powers, which are found not in a specific
constitutional provision, but rather in the court's inherent duty to pro-
tect the integrity of the judicial system.57
Using the prosecutorial misconduct doctrine, courts shift their focus
from the quality of the evidence tendered to the grand jury, to the con-
duct of the prosecutor presenting the evidence.5" According to the doc-
trine, courts consider whether the prosecutor acted imprudently in
co-conspirator testified before the grand jury about the time of conception of the conspiracy. Prior
to trial he told the prosecutor that he had pejured himself. Although the prosecutor informed the
defense counsel about the perjured testimony he failed to inform the court or the grand jury. Id.
at 784. The perjured statement was material because the conspiracy statute had been amended to
impose a lesser penalty. The court, reversing the conviction, asserted that the prosecutor's failure
to inform the court and grand jury resulted in a distortion of the case and a breach of duty to the
court and the grand jury by the prosecutor. Id. at 785-87. Basurto, however, was severely limited
by Bracy v. United States, 435 U.S. 1301 (1978) (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice) (perjured testimony at
grand jury not violative of fifth amendment). See 8 J. MOORE, supra note 9, 6.04[2], at 6-83.
Courts have also applied the prosecutorial misconduct doctrine to cases in which the prosecu-
tor's failure to present exculpatory evidence misleads the grand jury. Although the prosecutor has
no explicit duty to present exculpatory evidence before the grand jury, courts have found that the
prosecutor's failure to present such evidence distorts the case to the extent that the grand jury
cannot perform as an independent and informed body. See, e.g., United States v. Ciambrone, 601
F.2d 616, 623 (2d Cir. 1979) (dictum); United States v. Lawson, 502 F. Supp. 158, 172 (D. Md.
1980); United States v. Martin, 480 F. Supp. 880, 886 (S.D. Tex. 1979); United States v. Gold, 470
F. Supp. 1336, 1353 (N.D. Ill. 1979); United States v. Braniff Airways, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 579, 589
(W.D. Tex. 1977); United States v. DeMarco, 401 F. Supp. 505, 513 (C.D. Cal. 1975), ad, 550
F.2d 1224 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 827 (1977); United States v. Gallo, 394 F. Supp. 310,
315 (D. Conn. 1975); Note, The Prosecutor's Duty to Present Exculpatory Evidence to an Indicting
Grand Jury, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1514, 1514-38 (1977); Note, Grand Jury, supra note 54, at 114-15.
57. See United States v. Serubo, 604 F.2d 807, 816-17 (3d Cir. 1979) (exertion of supervisory
powers appropriate remedy to correct flagrant or persistent abuse). One commentator explained
the underlying rationale of supervisory powers:
[Tihe supervisory power possesses a significant potential for reconciling the conflicting
desires of the federal judiciary to improve standards for the protection of individual
rights while exercising the self-restraint appropriate to constitutional adjudication and to
the delicate balances of the federal system .... The unique contribution of the supervi-
sory power doctrine to resolution of this conflict is that it enables the Court to raise the
standards of fairness in the administration of federal justice in advance of the relatively
slow pace acceptable in the constitutional area.
Note, The Supervisory Po wer of the Federal Courts, 76 HARv. L. REV. 1656, 1666 (1963). See also
Holderman, Preindictment Prosecutorial Conduct in the Federal System, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMI-
NOLOGY 1, 17 (1980) (no "consistent" standard for application of doctrine).
The Supreme Court has encouraged lower courts to exercise their supervisory powers when
there is a threat to "the law as an institution, to the community at large, and to the democratic
ideal reflected in the processes of our courts." Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 195 (1946).
In Ballard, the Court used its supervisory power to reverse a conviction that was founded on an
indictment by a grand jury that intentionally excluded females. Id. at 193. See also supra note 56.
58. See, eg., United States v. Samango, 607 F.2d 877, 880 n.6, 885 (9th Cir. 1979) (indictment
dismissed because of prosecutor's conduct at grand jury); United States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306,
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presenting hearsay evidence to the grand jury. The doctrine, however,
often serves as a facade behind which courts perform the review that
Costello sought to curtail.59
B. United States v. Estepa
The Second Circuit is the only federal appellate court that has voiced
its dissatisfaction with Costello's allowance of the unqualified presenta-
tion of hearsay evidence by the prosecutor to the grand jury. From
1966 through 1972 the court grappled with the propriety of
prosecutorial use of hearsay when eyewitness testimony was readily
available. Though the court repeatedly warned prosecutors against the
practice, it refused to invoke the drastic measure of quashing an indict-
ment and reversing the subsequent conviction.6 °
1309 n.3 (9th Cir.) (issue not quantity or quality of evidence, but conduct of prosecutor), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 825 (1977).
59. See Arenella, supra note 3, at 540 ("[S]ome federal courts have cautiously begun to super-
vise the prosecutor's evidentiary presentation to the grand jury. . . . [T]hey have used a...
prosecutorial misconduct doctrine to circumvent Costello's prohibition against directly evaluating
the sufficiency of the evidence .. ").
60. Judge Friendly, in his dissenting opinion in United States v. Payton, 363 F.2d 996, 999-
1001 (2d Cir. 1966), voiced the first outcry in the Second Circuit against Costello. In Payton, the
defendant who was appealing his conviction on drug related charges, claimed that the prosecutor's
presentation of hearsay evidence to the grand jury deprived him of due process. The prosecutor
had presented the evidence to the grand jury through a narcotics agent who had no personal
knowledge of the drug transaction or conversations between defendant and the undercover agent.
Furthermore, the prosecutor did not explicitly inform the grand jury of the hearsay nature of the
agent's testimony. Id. at 998. Nevertheless, the Second Circuit refused the appeal, citing Costello.
Id. at 998-99. In his dissent, Judge Friendly argued that the use of hearsay before the grand jury
makes a "mockery" of the fifth amendment's protection. Id. at 999 (Friendly, J., dissenting).
In United States v. Umans, 368 F.2d 725 (2d Cir. 1966), the Second Circuit, in dictum, ex-
pressed its displeasure with use of hearsay at the grand jury. In Umans, the defendant was con-
victed of various crimes connected with bribing an Internal Revenue agent. Id. at 727. On
appeal, defendant questioned the sufficiency of the evidence presented to the grand jury. Interest-
ingly, none of the government's trial witnesses had appeared before the grand jury. Instead, Inter-
nal Revenue agents had summarized to the grand jury the contents of affidavits of the witnesses
who later appeared at trial. Id. at 730. Although the Second Circuit reluctantly adhered to the
Costello rule, it asserted in dictum:
[Wle think it not amiss for us to state that excessive use of hearsay in the presentation of
government cases to grand juries tends to destroy the historical function of grand juries
in assessing the likelihood of prosecutorial success and tends to destroy the protection
from unwarranted prosecutions that grand juries are supposed to afford to the innocent.
Hearsay evidence should only be used when direct testimony is unavailable or when it is
demonstrably inconvenient to summon witnesses able to testify to facts from personal
knowledge.
Id.
In 1968, the District Court for the Eastern District of New York espoused a unique interpreta-
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Finally, in 1972, the Second Circuit applied the prosecutorial mis-
conduct doctrine to quash a defendant's indictment in United States v.
Estepa.6  In Estepa, police conducted an undercover narcotics investi-
gation that resulted in criminal charges against defendant. The prose-
cutor failed to present to the grand jury any of the agents involved in
the investigation. The sole witness was a policeman who had extremely
limited personal knowledge of the investigation but had read the un-
dercover agents' reports.62 The prosecutor's questions and the police-
man's answers gave the grand jury the mistaken impression that the
tion of Costello. In United States v. Arcuri, 282 F. Supp. 347 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), defendant, who
was found guilty of passing counterfeit money, moved to set aside the verdict because the only
witness presented to the grand jury had no personal knowledge of the events and therefore the
evidence for indictment was insufficient. The court admonished the use of hearsay at the grand
jury and noted that the Costello Court did not intend to encourage such use. Instead, the court
interpreted Costello to preclude failures of indictments for the inadvertent or necessary use of
hearsay. Id. at 349. Criticizing the use of hearsay, the court stated:
[Hearsay] habituates the grand jury to rely upon 'evidence' which appears smooth, well
integrated and consistent in all respects. Particularly because neither cross-examinations
nor defense witnesses are available to them, grand jurors do not hear cases with the
rough edges that result from the often halting, inconsistent and incomplete testimony of
honest observers of events. Thus, they are unable to distinguish between prosecutions
which are strong and those which are relatively weak. All cases are presented in an
equally homogenized form. A grand jury so conditioned is unable to adequately serve
its functions as a screening agency. It cannot exercise its judgment in refusing to indict
in weak cases where, technically, a prima facie case may have been made out. It is,
moreover, unlikely to demand additional evidence.
Id. Nevertheless, the court decided not to reverse the indictment in Arcuri because the United
States Attorney had informed the court that his office discontinued the use of hearsay when wit-
nesses are available and because the defendant had not been prejudiced by the use of the hearsay.
Id. at 350. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision in United States v. Arcuri, 405
F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1968) (majority opinion authored by Judge Friendly), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 913
(1969). See Boudin, supra note 3, at 28-29 (Arcuri constitutes a "more enlightened supervisory
approach").
In 1969, the Second Circuit again encountered a case involving the unnecessary use of hearsay
at the grand jury, and again, reluctantly refused to reverse the indictment. In United States v.
Leibowitz, 420 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1969), defendant challenged his conviction for Selective Service
violations, arguing that it was premised on an indictment rendered by a grand jury that heard only
hearsay testimony despite the availability of eyewitness testimony. The court stated that dismissal
of an underlying indictment, and hence the subsequent conviction, should only be considered
when the grand jury is misled into thinking that the hearsay testimony is eyewitness testimony,
and if the defendant can show that there is a high probability that the grand jury would not have
indicted if it had been presented with eyewitness rather than hearsay testimony. Id. at 42. The
rationale underlying the two exceptions is that courts should dismiss indictments only when re-
quired to do so to protect the integrity of the judicial process. Id.
61. 471 F.2d 1132 (2d Cir. 1972). For a discussion of Esiepa, see 8 J. MOORE, supra note 9,
6.04[3]; Note, supra note 4, at 728 n.284.
62. 471 F.2d at 1134-35.
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policeman had been closely involved in the investigation. 63
Although the Second Circuit noted its concern about opening an-
other avenue for attacking convictions on grounds unrelated to the
merits, 64 it believed that the prosecutor's deceptive use of hearsay in
this case so impaired the grand jury's perception of the evidence that
dismissal of the indictment was necessary in order to protect the integ-
rity of the judicial system.65 The court stated that the prosecutor's pres-
entation of hearsay evidence is unacceptable in either of two situations:
first, it is unacceptable if the prosecutor deceives the grand jurors about
the quality of the evidence presented; second, it is unacceptable if there
exists a high probability that the grand jurors would not have indicted
had they heard eyewitness rather than hearsay testimony.66
The Second Circuit's drastic effort to deter prosecutors from unnec-
essarily presenting hearsay to the grand jury, however, has had an in-
significant impact on prosecutorial practices.67 Prosecutors in the
Second Circuit avoid Estepa's consequences simply by informing the
grand jury that the evidence presented is hearsay.68 Consequently, the
63. Id. at 1135 & n.4.
64. Id. at 1137.
65. id.
66. Id.
67. See Arenella, supra note 3, at 544-45:
Esepa. . . attempted to fashion a rule consistent with Costello that would trigger judi-
cial intervention only when the prosecutor egregiously impairs the grand jury's ability to
screen guilt. Far from signalling a new judicial willingness to require the prosecutor to
present the government's best evidence to the grand jury, Estepa merely expressed the
court's pique with federal prosecutors who continued to violate the minimal obligations
placed on them. . . . The ironic result is a rule that accomplishes little but is nonethe-
less inconsistent with Costello.
68. See United States v. Artuso, 618 F.2d 192, 197 n.23 (2d Cir.) (dismissal in Estepa because
of failure to heed repeated warnings), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 861 (1980); United States v. James,
609 F.2d 36, 49 (2d Cir. 1979) (distinguished from Estepa because prosecutor told grand jury that
evidence was hearsay), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 905 (1980); United States v. Brown, 602 F.2d 1073,
1076-78 (2d Cir.) (reinstated indictment because district court abused discretionary supervisory
powers), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 952 (1979); United States v. Vila, 599 F.2d 21, 25 (2d Cir.) (no proof
of deception), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 837 (1979); United States v. Schlesinger, 598 F.2d 722, 726 (2d
Cir.) (Estepa not applicable when the only evidence presented to second grand jury was record of
testimony from first grand jury summarized by prosecutor), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 880 (1979);
United States v. Broward, 594 F.2d 345, 351 (2d Cir.) (refused to apply Estepa because defendant
failed to show prejudice), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979); United States v. Fields, 592 F.2d 638,
647-48 (2d Cir. 1978) (refused to apply Estepa to a one-time incident of government misconduct),
cert. denied, 442 U.S. 917 (1979); United States v. Marchand, 564 F.2d 983, 1001 n.29 (2d Cir.
1977) (neither prong of Estepa test met), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1015 (1978); United States v. Mase,
556 F.2d 671, 676 (2d Cir. 1977) (indictment not prejudiced by lack of preindictment hearing),
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 916 (1978); United States v. Ramirez, 482 F.2d 807, 811-12 (2d Cir.) (no
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Second Circuit has had few opportunities to apply the Estepa holding
to reverse an indictment.6 9
C. Reaction to Estepa
Other circuits have given Estepa a mixed reception.7" The Fifth and
Third Circuits, although expressly supporting Estepa, have not actually
applied it to dismiss an indictment. In United States v. Cruz,71 the Fifth
Circuit restricted Estepa by interpreting it to require dismissal only
when the hearsay evidence misled the grand jury and a high
probability existed that the grand jury would not have returned the
indictment had it heard eyewitness rather than hearsay testimony.72
Subsequently, the Third Circuit, in United States v. Wander,73 adopted
the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of Estepa. 4
deception), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1070 (1973); United States v. Ferretti, 508 F. Supp. 913, 917
(E.D. Pa. 1981) (failed to fulfill Estepa test); United States v. Gordon, 493 F. Supp. 814, 817
(N.D.N.Y. 1980) (no deception), af'd, 655 F.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1981); United States v. Olin Corp.,
465 F. Supp. 1120, 1135-36 (W.D.N.Y. 1979) (failed to fulfill Estepa test); United States v. Reilly,
456 F. Supp. 211, 216 n.2 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (Estepa merely guideline for court's discretion), a9'd
mera., 601 F.2d 577 (3d Cir. 1979).
But see United States v. Jacobs, 547 F.2d 772, 773 (2d Cir. 1976) (Estepa applied because incon-
sistent practice of prosecutors in circuit, but court's holding a one-time sanction to encourage
uniformity), cert. denied 436 U.S. 31 (1978); United States v. Bertolotti, 529 F.2d 149, 159 (2d Cir.
1975) (Estepa applied to dismiss indictment); United States v. Gallo, 394 F. Supp. 310, 314-15 (D.
Conn. 1975) (motion to dismiss indictment granted, inter alia, because prosecutor should have
informed grand jury of availability of live testimony).
See also 8 J. MOORE, supra note 9, 6.0413], at 6-84. Moore argues that Estepa has had an
insignificant impact on prosecutorial practices because prosecutors have learned to inform grand
juries of the hearsay quality of the evidence.
69. See supra note 68.
70. See 8 J. MOORE, supra note 9, 6.0413], at 6-83 & n.34.
71. 478 F.2d 408 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
72. Id. at 410. In Cruz, the Fifth Circuit also noted that the "best evidence" rule espoused by
the Second Circuit is merely a guideline for courts exercising their discretion to protect citizens
from possible prosecutorial manipulation of grand jury proceedings. Id. at 411. See also United
States v. Georgalis, 631 F.2d 1199, 1206 (5th Cir. 1980) (dismiss indictment only when defendant
demonstrates biased or illegally constituted grand jury); United States v. Mclnnis, 601 F.2d 1319,
1328 (5th Cir. 1979) (dismiss indictment only if prosecutor's conduct abrogates constitutional
right); United States v. Cathey, 591 F.2d 268, 272 & n.5 (5th Cir. 1979) (dismiss indictment only if
grand jury integrity impaired).
73. 601 F.2d 1251 (3d Cir. 1979).
74. Id. at 1260. In Wander, defendant was convicted for violations of the Travel Act. The
underlying indictment was based on testimony of an FBI agent and a transcript of testimony from
the first grand jury proceedings. The Third Circuit ruled that the prosecutor's reading of a tran-
script from a prior grand jury to the indicting grand jury does not amount to grand jury abuse or
deception; therefore, Estepa was inapplicable. Id.
But see United States v. Serubo, 604 F.2d 807 (3d Cir. 1979). In Serubo, the court remanded the
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The First and Tenth Circuits have acknowledged the actions taken
by the Estepa court as the requisite response for a court that finds in-
tentional prosecutorial distortion of evidence presented to the grand
jury.'- These circuits, however, by distinguishing factually the cases
before them, have refrained from commenting on whether they would
apply the Estepa holding given similar factual situations.76
In United States v. Chanen,7 the Ninth Circuit disapproved of Es-
tepa's broad interpretation of judicial supervisory powers and cau-
tioned that expansive application of supervisory powers could subvert
the separation of powers doctrine.7" The lower court in Chanen dis-
missed the indictment and asserted that the prosecutor should have
presented live testimony.79 In reversing the dismissal, the Ninth Cir-
cuit reprimanded the district court for exceeding its authority by inter-
fering with a standard prosecutorial decision concerning what evidence
to present to the grand jury and how to present it.8 °
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit refused to apply Estepa in United States
case to the lower court to determine if the prosecutorial improprieties that plagued the first grand
jury were transmitted to the indicting grand jury. The court noted that the prosecutor is "virtually
immune from public scrutiny" and that he should not be allowed to abuse his special relationship
with the grand jury. Therefore, if the abuses from the first grand jury were transmitted to the
indicting grand jury, then the indictment must be dismissed. Id. at 816-17.
75. See infra note 76.
76. See United States v. Rogers, 652 F.2d 972, 975 (10th Cir. 1981) (no dismissal unless
grand jury intentionally misled or deceived); United States v. Hubbard, 603 F.2d 137, 141 (10th
Cir. 1979) (only apply Estepa when grand jury intentionally misled or deceived); United States v.
Oliver, 570 F.2d 397, 402 (1st Cir. 1978) (grand jury not misinformed about quality of evidence;
therefore, Estepa inapplicable).
77. 549 F.2d 1306, 1312 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 434 U.S. 825 (1977). Accord United States v.
Samango, 607 F.2d 877, 880 n.6 (9th Cir. 1979). See also United States v. Vargas-Rios, 607 F.2d
831, 835 (9th Cir. 1979) (indictment not dismissed because government agent made inadvertant
innocent misstatement); United States v. Owen, 580 F.2d 365, 367 (9th Cir. 1978) (supervisory
powers often discussed but seldom invoked); United States v. Kennedy, 564 F.2d 1329, 1338 (9th
Cir. 1977) (only dismiss indictment in cases of flagrant abuse); United States v. Acosta, 526 F.2d
670, 674 (5th Cir. 1976) (defendant entitled to "take advantage of any error" that prejudices him,
but must be adversely affected); United States v. McCord, 509 F.2d 334, 349 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(dismissal warranted only when serious prosecutorial misconduct pollutes criminal process);
United States v. Thompson, 493 F.2d 305, 308-09 (9th Cir. 1974) (prejudice must be shown);
United States v. Fox, 425 F.2d 996, 1001 (9th Cir. 1970) (decision to quash indictment
discretionary).
78. 549 F.2d at 1313. See generally Note, supra note 4, at 704-05.
79. 549 F.2d at 1308. In Chanen, the prosecutor presented live testimony to the first indicting
grand jury. The jury was discharged before voting on the indictment. At the second grand jury,
the indictment of which was challenged, the prosecutor simply read the transcript from the first
grand jury to the second grand jury. Id.
80. Id at 1312-13.
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v. Barone.8' In Barone, the prosecutor presented ten eyewitnesses to
the first grand jury, which refused to indict. At the second grand jury,
which did indict defendant, the prosecutor presented only a single nar-
cotics agent who had no personal knowledge of the crime. In addition,
the prosecutor failed to inform the grand jury about the proceedings at
the first grand jury.82 In rejecting the claim of prosecutorial impropri-
ety, the Sixth Circuit indicated that it would not follow the Second Cir-
cuit's position because of the strong historical policy considerations
voiced in Costello.83
Thus, the other circuits have refused to follow the Second Circuit's
attempt to limit the use of hearsay testimony at the grand jury. After
the Supreme Court's decision in Costello, the debate over the quality of
the evidence considered by the grand jury was thought to be entirely
foreclosed. The Second Circuit's exercise of its supervisory powers to
dismiss an indictment based solely on hearsay, however, has caused the
debate to resurface. Nevertheless, the sporadic assertion of supervisory
powers by courts has not noticeably deterred prosecutors from present-
ing hearsay to grand juries.84
IV. STATE EFFORTS TO LIMIT HEARSAY AT THE GRAND JURY
In Hurtado v. California,5 the Supreme Court decided that the fifth
amendment's grand jury provision is not applicable to the states. Nev-
ertheless, the federal grand jury system has served as a model for the
creation of state grand juries.86 Although some state constitutions have
provisions enabling their legislatures to abolish the grand jury,87 pres-
81. 584 F.2d 118, 125 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979). See also United
States v. Fife, 573 F.2d 369, 372 (6th Cir. 1976) (distinguished Estepa because no witnesses ap-
peared before grand jury, therefore grand jury not misled), cert. denied sub nom Klein v. United
States, 430 U.S. 933 (1977).
But see United States v. Luna, 525 F.2d 4, 8 (6th Cir. 1975) (notwithstanding prejudice, dismis-
sal required if pejured testimony introduced), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 965 (1976).
82. 584 F.2d at 122-23.
83. Id. at 125.
84. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text. As Arenella asserted: "Mhe pros-
ecutorial misconduct doctrine is at best a stopgap measure. It can mitigate the worst excesses
generated by Costello." Arenella, supra note 3, at 558.
85. 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
86. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, SURVEY OF STATE
GRAND JURY PRACTICES (1978), reprinted in 1978 Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 926, 927 app.
[hereinafter cited as Survey].
87. Id. at 927 app. n.2.
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ently every state has retained the grand jury as a method for initiating
criminal prosecutions."8
The prosecutorial use of hearsay evidence at the grand jury is also
common at the state level.89 Some states, however, have enacted stat-
utes to remedy the perceived problem.90 These statutes are either advi-
sory or mandatory in form. An advisory statute provides guidelines for
grand jurors to follow in weighing the evidence. In contrast, a
mandatory statute dictates the legal standard of evidence that must be
met in order to preserve the indictment.
State advisory statutes fall into three categories, the first being per-
missive.' The Louisiana statute, for example, states that grand juries
"should" receive only legal evidence.9 2 The commentary to the section
defines "should" as a middle ground between the mandatory "shall"
and the discretionary "may. 93
Advisory statutes in the second category appear to be mandatory, but
specifically prohibit dismissal of indictments upon violation.94 For ex-
ample, the California statute commands that "[t]he grand jury shall re-
ceive none but evidence that would be admissible over objection at the
trial."95 If the grand jury receives inadmissible evidence, however, Cal-
ifornia courts may not dismiss the indictment "where sufficient compe-
tent evidence to support the indictment was received by the grand
jury.' ' 96
88. Id. at 927 app.
89. Id. at 969 app. n.54.
90. See infra notes 91-103 and accompanying text.
91. See E. CPtAwFoR-D, THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES 261-62 (1940).
92. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 442, comments a-d (West 1967). See also State v.
Bullis, 93 Idaho 749, 472 P.2d 315 (1970) (record must clearly show inadmissible evidence; court
will not speculate that grand jury heard hearsay); 4 IDAHO CODE 19-1105 (1947) (grand jury can
receive none but legal evidence.
93. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 442, comment d (West 1967).
94. See F. DWARRIS, STATUTES AND RULES OF CONSTRUCTION 220-25 (1885).
95. CAL. PENAL CODE § 939.6(b) (Deering 1971).
96. Id. California courts have become more liberal in permitting the presentation of inad-
missible evidence to the grand jury. Compare People v. Fujita, 43 Cal. App. 3d 454, 117 Cal. Rptr.
757 (1974) (presentation of inadmissible evidence to the grand jury does not itself invalidate in-
dictment), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 964 (1975) and People v. Backus, 23 Cal. 3d 360, 590 P.2d 837, 52
Cal. Rptr. 710 (1979) (dismissed only when hearsay evidence compromises independence of grand
jury) with Dong Haw v. Superior Court, 81 Cal. App. 2d 153, 183 P.2d 725 (1947) (indictment
based on hearsay dismissed because no legal evidence to support, so grand jury acted in excess of
its authority). See also N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-10.1-26(2) (1981) (provides that grand jury "shall"
receive only evidence that would be admissible over objection at trial; but if violated, indictment
will not be dismissed if grand jury received sufficient competent evidence to support indictment);
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The third category of advisory statutes includes those that are
phrased as commands but are interpreted by state courts as directives. 97
The New Mexico statute, for example, provides that the evidence
presented to the grand jury must be such as would be legally admissible
at trial.98 In Maldonado v. State,99 however, the Supreme Court of
New Mexico held that in the interest of judicial economy and grand
jury secrecy the statute must be interpreted as advisory rather than
mandatory.1°°
There are two types of mandatory state statutes. 0' The first, adopted
by the New York, Utah, and South Dakota legislatures, consists of a
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-918 (1947) (provides grand jury shall receive only legal evidence); 1981 KY.
REv. STAT. & R. SERV. 5.08 (Baldwin) (legislature deleted the word "competent" from statute,
saying grand jury shall indict on what it believes to be sufficient evidence; however, no judicial
review of evidence presented). But see McDonald v. State, 155 Ark. 142, 244 S.W. 20 (1922)
(construing Arkansas statute as directive rather than mandatory).
97. See E. CRAWFORD, supra note 91, at 261-62; F. DWARRiS, supra note 94, at 220-25.
98. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-6-1 1(A) (1978). This statute was amended following the Maldo-
nado decision, discussed infra notes 99-100.
99. 93 N.M. 670, 604 P.2d 363 (1979). In Maldonado, defendant was convicted of criminal
trespass. He appealed claiming that the evidence violated N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-6-1 1(A) (1978).
The court of appeals rejected the appeal, asserting that New Mexico courts have no authority to
review the sufficiency of the evidence.
100. 93 N.M. at 671, 604 P.2d at 364. The New Mexico Supreme Court ruled that: "statutes
such as 31-6-11 (A), governing the kind, character, and degree of evidence ... produced before a
grand jury. . . are directory and for the guidance of the grand jury." Id. The court, however,
noted that this ruling does not give prosecutors "unbridled discretion" to use inadmissible evi-
dence. The court declared that prosecutors "must abide by the letter and spirit of our laws, and
this precludes their use of inadmissible evidence." Id. Nevertheless, the court believed that judi-
cial review of the evidence would unduly impede judicial economy and grand jury secrecy. Id.
Consequently, in 1981, the New Mexico Legislature amended 31-6-11(A) by deleting the "le-
gally admissible" evidence requirement and adding a provision that precludes judicial review of
sufficiency and competency of the evidence before the grand jury, absent a showing of bad faith
on the part of the prosecutor. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-6-1 1(A) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
But see Buzbee v. Donnelly, 96 N.M. 692, 634 P.2d 1244 (1981). In Buzbee, the court inter-
preted the 1981 amended statute as precluding judicial review of the evidence, but noted that the
legislature failed to amend N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-6-6-6 (1978). That statutory provision requires
that grand jurors take an oath to base an indictment only on "legal evidence." 96 N.M. at 706, 634
P.2d at 1258.
The Nevada courts have reached similar results. NEv. REv. STAT. § 172.135(2) (1967) provides
that the "grand jury can receive none but legal evidence, and the best evidence in degree, to the
exclusion of hearsay or secondary evidence." Compare Shelby v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 82
Nev. 213, 418 P.2d 132 (1966) (statute permits defendants to challenge indictment based on suffi-
ciency of evidence) with Franklin v. State, 89 Nev. 382, 513 P.2d 1252 (1973) (court refused to
dismiss indictment saying that an accused is entitled to "fair but not perfect consideration" before
the grand jury).
101. See Survey, supra note 86, at 967 app. infra notes 102-03.
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blanket proclamation that standard rules of evidence shall be applied
in grand jury proceedings. 10 2  The second approach, used only by
Alaska, explicitly prohibits the presentation of hearsay evidence to the
grand jury, but includes enumerated exceptions.10 3
V. THE RESPONSE OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
Over a decade ago, the American Bar Association's Grand Jury
Committee recommended the inclusion of a provision in the grand jury
reform proposal that would limit, but not abolish, the use of hearsay
102. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 190.30 (Consol. 1979) (governing rules of evidence with respect
to criminal proceedings applicable to grand jury). See People v. Jackson, 18 N.Y.2d 516, 223
N.E.2d 790, 277 N.Y.S.2d 263 (1966) (reversed conviction due to incompetent hearsay at grand
jury); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-5-15 (1979) (rules of evidence shall apply to grand jury).
See also UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-11-3 (Supp. 1981). See generally State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 778,
783-84 & 786 n.33 (Utah 1980). In.4nderson, the court compared the use of hearsay at prelimi-
nary hearings and grand juries. The court ruled that hearsay evidence impaired the ability of the
preliminary hearing to eliminate improvident prosecutions and concluded that it should not be
used. Colorado has no statutory provision governing the quality of evidence at the grand jury.
One Colorado court, however, has denounced the use of hearsay evidence at preliminary hearings.
See McDonald v. District Court, 195 Col. 159, 576 P.2d 169 (1978).
For an in depth discussion of the New York statute, see Note, supra note 8, at 113-14.
103. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 6(r): "Hearsay evidence shaU not be presented to the grand jury
absent compelling justification for its introduction. If hearsay evidence is presented to the grand
jury, the reasons for its use shall be stated on the record."
An early Alaska case, Taggard v. State, 500 P.2d 238 (Alaska 1972), held that the prosecutor
who presents hearsay evidence to the grand jury must also give a detailed account of the original
declarant's activity. Id. at 243. Subsequently, in State v. Johnson, 525 P.2d 532 (Alaska 1974), the
court upheld the use of hearsay because the witness's testimony provided the grand jury with
sufficient evidence to judge the reliability and credibility of the absent declarant. Additionally,
the court found that the declarant was legitimately inaccessible because his father was dying in
another state. Id. at 536.
The Alaska Supreme Court, however, limited the breadth of the "compelling justification" ex-
ception of Rule 6(r) in State v. Gieffels, 554 P.2d 460 (Alaska 1976). In Giefels, the court ruled
that the "mere expense of transportation for absent witnesses" is not a compelling justification.
Id. at 465. Gieffels was reaffirmed in Adams v. State, 598 P.2d 503 (Alaska 1979). In Adams, the
court reversed the conviction because the prosecutor introduced a hearsay report of a doctor
rather than bringing him in to court to testify. The court reiterated that cost is not a sufficient
justification for using hearsay. Id. at 508.
More recently, in Putnam v. State, 629 P.2d 35 (Alaska 1980), the Alaska Supreme Court re-
treated from its strict enforcement of Rule 6(r). In Putnam, the court refused to reverse the con-
viction even though unjustified hearsay testimony was presented to the grand jury because the
court was convinced that the defendant was not prejudiced. Id. at 40. In Giacomazzi v. State, 633
P.2d 218 (Alaska 1981), the court rejected a defendant's appeal based on the prosecutor's violation
of Rule (6)(r) because the other evidence presented to the grand jury supported the indictment.
The trend in the Alaska court appears to be emasculating the mandatory language of Rule 6(r).
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evidence in a federal grand jury inquiry. 0 4 The provision is unique in
requiring that the prosecutor subjectively 0 5 believe that the evidence
he seeks to introduce before the grand jury would be admissible at
trial.0 6  The alleged prosecutorial manipulation of grand juries
through usurpation of their evidentiary screening function inspired the
ABA's movement for grand jury reform. Accordingly, the ABA Grand
Jury Committee placed the burden of deciding which evidence com-
plied with the proposed standard on the prosecutor rather than on the
court or the grand jury.10 7 The provision, however, fails to provide
104. AMERICAN BAR ASS'N PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS
RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION § 3.6(a) (Approved
Draft 1971). The commentary explains:
The need to use a summary of available evidence may arise in cases involving volumi-
nous records or where an absent witness has given a written statement but is unavailable
and circumstances justify prompt grand jury action. Similarly, where the victim of a
criminal act is seriously injured and cannot attend, someone to whom the relevant facts
have been related should be permitted to testify before the grand jury. A third illustra-
tive situation is where the safety of an important witness reasonably warrants that his or
her identity remain secret and recorded statements of the witness be presented to the
grand jury.
Id. at § 3.6 commentary. But see Arenella, supra note 3, at 580-81 app. Professor Arenella was a
member of the ABA Grand Jury Committee and the chairperson of the ABA subcommittee which
drafted the proposed evidentiary reforms for the grand jury. In 1979, Arenella drafted a provision
to supercede § 3.6(a) and in 1980 the Grand Jury Committee approved his draft. The proposal
stated: "[Tihe prosecutor should not present the grand jury with hearsay evidence which would
not be admissible at trial absent some compelling justification for its use." Id. at 580 app,
Arenella provided three illustrations of "compelling justifications," which merely codified the
commentary of § 3.6(a). Id. at 580-81 app.
The Arenella proposal encompassed one important addition to the 1971 ABA draft: a provision
for judicial review. Id. at 581-82 app. Nevertheless, Arenella's provision is extremely narrow.
The defendant must voice his objection to the indictment within 30 days of entering his plea. Not
only must the defendant prove that inadmissible evidence was presented, but also he must show
"strong grounds. . . that the grand jury would not have indicted [him]... had the inadmissible
evidence not been entered." Furthermore, the indictment is not reviewable after a defendant's
conviction. Id. See generally Keeny & Walsh, The American Bar Association 'r Grand Jury Princi-
ples: A Critique From a Federal CriminalJustice Perspective, 14 IDAHO L. REv. 545, 559-62 (1978)
(critique favoring ABA principles).
105. See 1978 Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 147 (statement of Richard Gerstein, Chair-
man, ABA Criminal Justice Section). Mr. Gerstein asserts that the subjective standard is a "delib-
erate" reaction to "concerns expressed by the Justice Department and other prosecutors as to the
workability" of a limitation on evidence at the grand jury. But see id at 105-06 (statement by
Justice Department). The Justice Department believes that any imposition of evidentiary rules
would only cause extensive litigation.
106. See Holderman, supra note 57, at 4 (ABA standard is "benchmark" for prosecutors).
107. See 1978 Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 162 (statement of Professor Melvin Lewis,
John Marshall Law School); Arenella, supra note 3, at 580 app..
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expressly for judicial review of the prosecutor's decision.' 8
The ABA's present position on the use of inadmissible evidence at
the grand jury is uncertain. In 1981, a minority of ABA delegates
voiced strong opposition to the inclusion of such a provision in the
grand jury reform proposal. Consequently, the Governing Council of
the Criminal Justice Section of the ABA deleted the provision. In Jan-
uary 1982 the ABA House of Delegates unanimously approved the
abridged grand jury proposal without questioning the deletion.'0 9
VI. ACTION BY CONGRESSIONAL SUBCOMMITTEES
Subcommittees of both houses of Congress' 10 have discussed reforms
that would restrict the use of hearsay at the grand jury. During the
Ninety-fourth Congress, for example, the House of Representatives
Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship & International Law"'.
considered two identical bills requiring the grand jury to indict only on
the basis of competent and admissible evidence." 2 These bills, how-
ever, limited the court's power to dismiss indictments based on incom-
petent or inadmissible evidence only to those situations in which,
absent the incompetent or inadmissible evidence, the grand jury did
not receive sufficient evidence to warrant the indictment.' 
1 3
Similarly, during the Nineth-Fifth Congress, the same subcommittee
considered two distinct proposals to impose increased responsibility on
the impanelling judge. "4 The first required that the judges give the
grand jury "adequate and reasonable notice" of the requirement that
indictments be based on legally sufficient evidence." 5 The second bill
was comparable to the first but required, additionally, that the judge
give such notice in writing and that he believe that the grand jury rea-
108. The provisions in the ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 1-1, 7-4, 7-13
(1980), which require attorneys to act in good faith, arguably provide sufficient supervision.
109. See Vilkin, ABA Passes Amended Model Grand Jury Law, Nat'l L. J., February 15, 1982,
at 3, col. 1.
110. See infra notes 111-19 and accompanying text. These proposals, however, have never
moved beyond the subcommittee stage. In the 97th Congress two grand jury reform bills were
considered, S.988 and H.R. 4272. Neither proposed to restrict the use of hearsay evidence.
111. This is a subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary.
112. See H.R. 11660 and H.R. 6006, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), reprintedin 1976 House Hear-
ings, supra note 31, at 564, 584.
113. Id.
114. See infra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
115. See H.R. 2620, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), reprinted in Grand Jury Reform, supra note
30, at 1020, 1025-26.
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sonably understood the notice." 6 Both bills provided for dismissal of
the indictment, either pretrial or postconviction, if the impanelling
judge failed to give the requisite notice to the grand jury. 7
In the Senate proposal, however, the prosecutor could present hear-
say evidence, and the grand jury could base an indictment on such evi-
dence, if the prosecutor demonstrated good cause to the impanelling
judge to do so." 8 The Senate bill limited dismissal of indictments to
cases in which the permissible evidence, without consideration of pro-
hibited hearsay, failed to establish probable cause. Thus, the Senate
proposal would regard any violations of the evidentiary restrictions as
harmless if the minimum standard of probable cause was met. ' 9
VII. ANALYSIS
The grand jury is, in theory, an independent reviewer of evidence
which protects citizens against unfounded charges by serving as a check
on the prosecutor's decision to press charges. 2 ° Costello'2 ' and its
progeny,122 however, have severely restricted the grand jury's ability to
perform this valuable check. By allowing the prosecutor to present
hearsay testimony, these decisions give the prosecutor an opportunity
to distort the strength of the state's case. 12
Although some federal courts have attempted to circumvent Cos-
tello's ban on reviewing the quality of the evidence presented to the
grand jury by invoking the prosecutorial misconduct doctrine,' 24 these
courts constitute the exception rather than the rule.' 21 On the whole,
the federal courts have indicated that they are either unwilling or un-
116. See H.R. 3726, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), reprinted in Grand Jury Reform, supra note
30, at 1079-80.
117. Id. at 1081; H.R. 2620, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977),reprintedin Grand Jury Reform,supra
note 30, at 1027.
118. See S.3405, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), reprinted in 1978 Senate Hearings, supra note 3,
at 24-25 app.
119. Id.
120. See 1976 House Hearings, supra note 31, at 379; L. CLARK, supra note 30, at 108-11; M.
FRANKEL, supra note 30, at 117-21; supra note 40.
121. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956). See supra notes 42-49 and accompanying
text.
122. See supra note 54.
123. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 55-69 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 70-84 and accompanying text.
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able to correct the problems precipitated by Costello.126 In addition,
judicial interpretations of state statutes as advisory instead of
mandatory have blunted legislative efforts to circumvent Costello.27
Thus, federal legislative action provides the only effective method of
curtailing the impact of Costello.t28 State legislative action has demon-
strated that a legislative solution must be thorough and precise in order
to avoid judicial interpretation diminishing its effect. 129 This requires
not only that the legislature impose specific obligations on the grand
jurors, the impanelling judge, the prosecutor, and the reviewing court,
but also that it impose strict penalties for violations.
The legislature should compel the grand jurors to disregard hearsay
evidence in making their indictment decisions.1 30  As lay persons, the
grand jurors can perform this task only if the impanelling judge in-
structs them not to consider hearsay evidence. 13! The impanelling
judge should administer the instruction after the grand jury is sworn in
126. Id.
127. See supra notes 85-103 and accompanying text.
128. An alternative to a legislative solution is a judicial resolution of the problem. In Hawkins
v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. 3d 584, 586 P.2d 916, 150 Cal. Rptr. 435 (1978), defendant argued that
his prosecution by grand jury indictment rather than by preliminary hearing denied him equal
protection of the law guaranteed by article 1, section 7 of the California Constitution. This argu-
ment stemmed from the lesser procedural rights guaranteed to a defendant during the indictment
procedure. The California Supreme Court agreed with defendant and resolved that defendant
was entitled to a postindictment preliminary hearing to rectify the disparate procedural rights.
The California approach has been considered and rejected by one federal court. United States
v. Shober, 489 F. Supp. 393 (E.D. Pa. 1979). In Shober, the district court distinguished Hawkins
because it was a state case. Whereas California law permits the prosecutor to choose to proceed
either by grand jury or by preliminary hearing, the federal constitution mandates that felony
prosecutions proceed by way of the grand jury. In the federal system, a defendant is entitled to a
preliminary examination no later than 10 days from his initial appearance if he is in custody and
20 days if he is not in custody. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(c). If the defendant is indicted prior to the
date of the preliminary examination, however, the right to the preliminary examination is auto-
matically waived. Id. at 5. l(a). For the sake of efficiency, jurisdictions customarily indict prior to
the date of the preliminary hearing. In Skober, the court refused to elevate the incidental proce-
dural benefits provided during the preliminary hearing to the status of constitutional safeguards.
Therefore, the court held the equal protection argument advanced in Hawkins inapplicable to the
federal grand jury system. Nevertheless, Senator Eilberg advocated the California solution that
provides for a postindictment preliminary hearing. See 1978 Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 9.
129. See supra notes 90-103 and accompanying text.
130. See H.R. 11660, reprinted in 1976 House Hearings, supra note 31, at 564; H.R. 6006, re-
printed in 1976 House Hearings, supra note 31, at 584.
131. See 1978 Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 1633 app.; M. FRANKEL, supra note 30, at 121-
22; Note, supra note 4, at 727-29. The grand jurors, however, may consider hearsay evidence if
the impanelling judge has decided that such evidence is an exception to the hearsay prohibition.
See infra note 136.
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but before any evidence is presented. In addition, the judge should
provide the grand jurors with a written copy of his oral instructions.' 32
The judge should not allow the grand jury to hear evidence until he
believes that every grand juror comprehends the hearsay
instructions. 133
Moreover, the legislature should prohibit the prosecutor from
presenting evidence which he knows or should know is hearsay.'
34 If
the prosecutor believes that he must present hearsay evidence, he
should petition the impanelling judge prior to introducing such evi-
dence to the grand jury.' 35  His petition should demonstrate that an
overwhelming necessity compels the use of hearsay evidence in this
particular situation.' 36 The impanelling judge should use his discretion
to determine what constitues an "overwhelming necessity." 37 Consid-
erations of expense alone, however, should never satisfy the statutory
mandate.' 38  On appeal, the reviewing judge should uphold the deci-
sion of the impanelling judge unless the court finds that it was clearly
132. It is particularly important that the grand jurors receive a written copy of the instructions.
A grand juror cannot reasonably be expected to remember the judge's instruction over the course
of the grand jury proceedings. Therefore, a written copy will permit a grand juror to refresh his
recollection of the instructions during the proceedings.
Equally important is the initial oral explanation, which will circumvent the possibility that
grand jurors will not read or understand the written instructions.
133. See 1978 Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 1569 app. (statement of Doris Peterson, Center
for Constitutional Rights).
134. See 1978 Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 1092-93, 1096 app.; L. CLARK, supra note 30,
at 111-12; Arenella, supra note 3, at 580 app.. But see AMERICAN BAR Ass'N PROJECT ON STAN-
DARDS FOR CRIMINAL JuSTICE, supra note 104, at § 3.6(a) (subjective standard).
A report by the New York State Assembly, however, shows that a New York practice that
prohibits the prosecutor from introducing hearsay evidence has proved ineffective. In a study of
100 cases in which the prosecutor violated the prohibition, not one court imposed sanctions. See
1978 Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 1165 app.
135. It is important that the prosecutor not introduce the evidence until the judge has granted
him permission to do so. Although improperly introduced evidence may technically be retracted,
an impression has already been implanted in the minds of the grand jurors.
136. For examples of situations that could potentially qualify as exceptions, see AMERICAN
BAR AS'N PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 104, at 89 (voluminous
records, severely injured victim, safety of witness); Arenella, supra note 2, at 580-81 (ABA excep-
tions, plus: reports by professionals, witnesses attesting to minor facts).
137. See 1978 Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 5; L. CLARK, supra note 30, at 141-42.
138. See State v. Gieffels, 554 P.2d 460, 465 (Alaska 1976) (discussed supra note 103). Contra
1978 Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 1097 app. (statement of New Jersey Attorney General).
For example, presenting live testimony will always be more costly than reading a written state-
ment. If cost is permitted to be a factor to be considered in allowing the use of hearsay, then
prosecutors will routinely circumvent the prohibition.
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erroneous. 139
The legislature also should provide that if the impanelling judge de-
termines that the evidence may be presented, then the prosecutor must
advise the grand jury of the evidence's hearsay quality before he in-
troduces it.' 40 After the prosecutor presents the hearsay evidence, any
grand juror may request that the prosecutor present the original declar-
ant. 14  The prosecutor must either comply with the grand juror's re-
quest or retract the evidence. In retracting the evidence, the prosecutor
must notify the impanelling judge in writing and explain his failure to
comply.' 4
2
Finally, the legislature should allow the reviewing court to dismiss
the indictment 43 if, on a pretrial motion, the court finds that any one of
the actors failed to comply with any of the above provisions. The dis-
missal should be without prejudice'" and should be independent of the
quality or quantity of the other evidence considered. 145
If a defendant was either convicted at trial or if he pleaded guilty or
nolo contendere, the statute should no longer permit him to challenge
the indictment. The rationale for imposing more stringent controls on
the grand jury's screening function is to protect an innocent person
from being unnecessarily stigmatized by an indictment founded on
weak evidence.' 46 This rationale, however, ceases to exist once the de-
fendant is found guilty.
139. In order to avoid collateral attacks on the indictment because of the "overwhelming ne-
cessity" exception, the impanelling judge's decision should be conclusively presumed correct so
long as any evidence that was before him supported his conclusion.
140. Because grand jury proceedings often extend over a considerable period of time, a warn-
ing at the outset of the proceeding might be forgotten by the grand jurors. To enable the grand
jurors to competently distinguish between hearsay and other evidence, the prosecutor must rein-
force the hearsay quality of the evidence each time he presents it.
141. See 1978 Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 1097 app.; Arenella, supra note 3, at 581 app..
142. Notice of conffict should be on the record for the reviewing court.
143. See 1978 Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 1635-36 app.; M. FRANKEL, supra note 30, at
122.
144. A defendant whose conviction or indictment has been reversed should be subject to re-
indictment. If an indictment is dismissed because one of the judicial actors violated his statutory
duty, the defendant should not receive a windfall by being absolved from prosecution. See Hill v.
Texas, 316 U.S. 400, 406 (1942).
145. See 1978 Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 1202 app. (report by New York State Assem-
bly). Contra 1978 Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 1097-98 app.; H.R. 11660, reprinted in 1976
House Hearings, supra note 3 1, at 564; H.R. 6006, reprinted in 1976 House Hearings, supra note 31,
at 584; Contra Arenella, supra note 3, at 582 app..
146. See supra note 40.
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CONCLUSION
Courts' expansive reading of Costello produces inequitable results.' 7
Courts' 48 and state legislatures' 49 have attempted unsuccessfully to
curtail Costello's effect. Several prominent national forums have also
recognized the need for reform.'50 Congress, however, must curtail the
unfair results generated by the Costello decision. Congress must rectify
the problem by imposing mandatory duties on the grand jurors, the
impanelling judge, the prosecutor, and the reviewing court.
Beverly A. Patterson
147. See supra notes 8-15 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 55-84 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 85-103 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 104-19 and accompanying text.
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